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Abstract. The legitimation oftechnology poIicy is discussed from the point of view of the neoclas- 
sical and of the dynamic, Schumpeterian, pproach. The results are presented, using the traditional 
categories of policy legitimation i welfare theory: public goods, externalities, and merit goods. 
Art policy legitimation is discussed within the same conceptual framework. The application ofthe 
dynamic approach toart policy leads to conclusions similar to the general conclusions about technol- 
ogy policy. A review of the postwar development of (Dutch) art policy supports he impression that 
art policy may be on its way to become asubspecies of technology policy. 
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1. Introduction 
At first glance, technology policy and art policy seem to have little in common. 
This seems to be especially the case with respect to problems of "legitimation". It is 
commonly thought that money spent on art is difficult o justify on strict economic 
grounds. Some people conclude therefore that the arts should not be supported 
at all while other people simply deny that there is any need for "narrow" eco- 
nomic legitimation because art is a self-evident good thing which all good people 
should support. On the other hand, technological change has been shown to be a 
major explanation of productivity growth. Public policies to promote technological 
change are therefore generally thought o be more easily defensible on economic 
grounds. 
Most economic analyses of technology policy or art policy are based on neoclas- 
sical economic theory. However, especially in industrial economics, neoclassical 
theory has come to be replaced, or at least to be supplemented by, a new theoret- 
ical approach. This new approach as been called "dynamic", "Schumpeterian", 
or "evolutionary". Neoclassical theory and dynamic theory agree that public inter- 
vention can only be legitimate in case of market failure. A defense of governmental 
intervention in the arts must entail a demonstration of market failure in the arts 
market. However, the two approaches differ with respect o the question of what 
exactly constitutes a properly functioning market. According to neoclassical theo- 
ry, a "perfect" market is a market which is in a state of pareto-optimal equilibrium. 
Necessary conditions to achieve this state include that no agent on the market has 
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market power (all agents must be price takers) and that all agents dispose of perfect 
information. The defenders of the dynamic approach consider these conditions to 
be so unrealistic that a model using them as assumptions is fundamentally f awed. 
According to dynami c theory, a perfectly functioning market is a market in 
a state of continuous disequilibrium, allowing a maximum amount of innovation 
and change. Because the two approaches demand ifferent things of a functioning 
market, they also result in different conclusions with respect to the legitimacy of 
specific public interventions. 
The main subject of this paper is the legitimation of public support of the 
arts. The discussion of technology policy serves two aims. First, to compare the 
economic arguments hat have been proposed to justify support of technological 
innovation on the one hand and support of the arts on the other. Secondly, to 
consider whether the latest developments in technology policy are, or should be, 
mirrored by developments in art policy. 
This paper will attempt to present the arguments in favor of technology policy, 
first from a neoclassical point of view and then in the context of the dynamic 
approach. Following this, the arguments in favor of art policy will be discussed. 
Finally, conclusions will be reached about the relation between art policy and 
technology policy. I will treat both technology policy and art policy mainly in a 
national context. Issues having to do with international trade would complicate the 
discussion without changing the main argument. 
2. Technology Policy 
The importance of technology to economic success has been increasingly recog- 
nized, at the level of the economy, of the industry, and of the individual firm. 
Solow's (1957) seminal article and many later contributions in the same vein 
have shown how only a small part of productivity growth could be attributed to 
increasing capital intensity. The rest, the so-called "residual", has to be attributed 
to other causes among which "technological change" figures predominantly. Even 
earlier, Schumpeter mphasized the importance of innovation in explaining the 
growth of firms and industries. The microeconomic and the macroeconomic roles 
of technology were most clearly linked in the work of those writers who explained 
long-term acro developments in terms of clusters of Schumpeterian innovations 
in time (Mensch, 1979; Freeman et al., 1982; Kleinknecht, 1986) and in particular 
"leading" industries (Rostow, 1960, 1978; van Duijn, 1983). 
The attention given to the role of technology led to two seemingly contradictory 
responses. On the one hand, if technological change was so important, governments 
should consider it their task to actively promote innovation. Recent decades have 
seen all developed countries, and most of the less developed countries, explicitly 
adopting technology policies and explosively increasing the money spent. On the 
other hand, if innovation was such a good idea for enterprises, would not the market 
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process ensure a optimal allocation of means to innovative ventures, and would 
not public intervention lead to inefficiency? 
The answer to these questions is, again, that the government should intervene 
whenever the market process does not function properly, when there is market 
failure. Also, ideally the market should be the final arbiter of what constitutes good 
innovation and not the public authorities. However, as has already been noted, there 
is much disagreement among economists about what constitutes market failure and 
how common it is. Also, a not inconsiderable part of innovative activity does not 
come in contact with any real market. This is the case with research which cannot 
be directly transformed into marketable products, so-called basic science, and also 
with the many innovations which are performed in the "sheltered culture" (Derain, 
1990), connected with public procurement for the military, space exploration, 
public medicine tc. 
Arrow (1961) defined invention as the production of new information. The 
market for new information operates imperfectly because of three characteristics of 
the good in question: inappropriability, uncertainty, and indivisibility. The low costs 
of information transfer make it difficult, without public intervention, to exclude 
others from profiting from it. The production of new information is an intrinsically 
unpredictable and risky business; not only because of the nature of the product 
but also because of the impossibility of effectively monitoring the research effort 
of (potential) competitors. Moreover, information is very unevenly distributed 
between those who produce and those who finance. This, together with the problem 
of appropriability, can cause agency problems and market failure. New information, 
once produced, is indivisible and can be applied without extra costs to small or 
large production processes. Therefore, there exist evident scale advantages which 
can also cause market failure. 
Market failure such as that described by Anow leads to suboptimal allocation 
and especially underinvestment i  invention and innovation. Although there is 
a place for the public goods argument, he externalities argument dominates his 
analysis. The prescribed reaction of public authorities in the case of externalities 
is to correct relative prices by taxes, subsidies, or other means, such as providing 
complementary goods at artificially low price levels. 
Arrow's analysis serves to legitimate both direct subsidies for inventive or 
innovative behaviour and the patent system which helps to make new information 
appropriable, and, thereby, raises its price. Much research within the neoclassical 
equilibrium framework has been directed to the study of the efficacy of the current 
patent system and of possible alternatives (e.g. Mansfield et al., 1977; Scherer, 
1984; yon Ungern-Sternberg, 1984). 
Other writers, following the lead of yon Hayek and Schumpeter, have contested 
the validity of some of the crucial assumptions of neoclassical modelling. They 
reject equilibrium analysis and propose that competition could better be described 
as a dynamic process in a state of continuous disequilibrium. More specifically, 
they attack Arrow's analysis on four h~terrelated points: I) deviation from the 
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state of perfect competition, in which all agents are price takers, is the rule, not 
the exception; 2) both entrepreneurs/managers and public authorities have severe- 
ly limited capacities to collect and evaluate information; they live in a state of 
"bounded rationality" in Simon's ense; 3) information transfer is costly (Mowery 
and Rosenberg, 1990); 4) information transfer costs and the efficacy with which the 
patent system rewards innovators are highly variable across industries (Mansfield, 
1985; Levin, 1988). 
The last argument implies that even if Arrow's analysis was correct in all other 
respects, public intervention topromote innovation, and especially the patent sys- 
tem, would have to have different characteristics in different industries to remedy 
market failure. This seems extremely impractical, if not impossible, ven without 
taking into consideration the fact that the appropriability conditions of specific 
industries also change over time. 
Attempts have been made to counter the first argument by proposing that if 
the ideal situation of perfect competition is not attainable, public authorNes can 
nevertheless help bring about a second-best optimum by taking the market dis- 
tortions for granted and correcting relative prices. However, to do this effectively, 
public authorities must know the ratios of marginal costs and marginal rates of 
substitution of all goods and the external effects of production and consumption f 
any good on any other good. One does not have to invoke the concept of bounded 
rationality here to conclude that this assumption seems even more unrealistic than 
the assumption ofperfect competition. 
The next step could be to invoke the possibility of the existence of a third best 
optimum, reached by making a "reasonable probabilistic judgment" (Ng, 1979) 
about he second best world. "Third best theory suggests hat policy-makers exam- 
ine the information and decide whether, in the light of it, there are reasonable 
grounds for amending the first best rule appropriately if there is fairly precise 
information about he way in which an external (dis)economy generated in produc- 
ing good X operates via the substitutes and complements for X in creating further 
distortions - even though all the economy-wide ramifications are not known." 
(Hall, 1986). In reality, this means nothing more than making informed guesses 
about external effects. 
Although the critical arguments against neoclassical policy analysis eem quite 
convincing, and although new models of dynamic ompetition and the innovation 
process have been constructed (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982), these models have 
not yet been able to provide a completely new foundation for technology policy, 
Nevertheless, the "dynamic" critique has fundamentally reinterpreted the neoclas- 
sical arguments. Most importantly, market failure is considered tooccur whenever 
there seem to be impediments to the dynamic process of Schumpeterian competi- 
tion. The "perennial gale of creative destruction" asSchumpeter described it, must 
be allowed to run its course, unhampered byanticompetitive actions of enterprises 
or short-sighted public authorities. 
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To safeguard the market process in this sense, the center of gravity of tech- 
nology policy has increasingly shifted in the direction of the removal of barriers 
to innovation and barriers to entry. Barriers to entry are so important because it
has become clear that, on the one hand, a disproportionate amount of innovative 
activity is performed by new firms and on the other hand, old firms are driven 
to innovate by the threat of (new) competition (Scherer, 1980; Wijnberg, 1990). 
Competition policy and innovation policy have grown closer to each other. Public 
authorities do not attempt to bring the situation closer to an equilibrium optimum 
but to create conditions which allow as much room as possible for the process of 
innovative competition tobring forth new solutions. 
The recommendations resulting from the dynamic approach can still be described 
using the normal terminology of welfare theory. 
The public authorities should consider basic science, the results of which cannot 
be an object of patent protection, to be a public good. Education and "pure" 
research are considered in most countries to be a responsibility ofthe government. 
Fundamental research by private firms should also be supported on basis of the 
public good argument, especially if the research is directed to an area where the 
nation hopes to create a competitive advantage in the future. 
Innovative activities, other than basic science, can constitute a source of positive 
externalities. A part of these externalities can be internalized with the help of 
the patent system. However, patents generally allow only limited appropriation of
public benefits, especially in industries where technological change is exceptionally 
rapid. However, strengthening patent protection effectively in those industries, for 
instance by broadening the scope of a patent, could easily result in slowing down 
the pace of innovation in the long run. 
Therefore, governments may consider it necessary to subsidize innovation in 
particular industries. However, the process of dynamic ompetition should not 
be hampered by public intervention. Support for innovation, on the basis of the 
externalities argument, can only be justified in the context of an analysis of the 
effects on barriers to entry. 
The merit good argument should be used sparingly and not so much to justify 
subsidizing innovation as to justify subsidizing the dissemination f information 
about innovation, innovations, and science, especially to smaller firms. This, again, 
would have the effect of lowering barriers to entry (and innovation). 
Thus, technology policy should consist of public support for basic science and 
the scientific infrastructure; support for innovative activities with evidently high 
positive externalities, but only in so far as raising this support is not likely to 
endanger the process of dynamic ompetition by having a negative ffect on the 
barriers to entry and, finally, other types of public intervention explicitly aimed at 
lowering barriers to entry, especially through disseminating information. 
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3. Art Policy 
Few economists have yet seriously attempted toexplain part of the "residual", the 
productivity growth left unexplained by changes in capital intensity, as the effect 
of the arts or of artistic change. 
Nevertheless, art in the workplace iscredited with raising creativity and produc- 
tivity (Martorella, 1990). Certainly, the correlation between ational artistic and 
economic success is far from perfect. However, this may be caused by the fact that 
the national appropriability of art is even smaller than the national appropriability 
of pure science. 
Before discussing why governments should or should not support he arts, it 
would be nice to answer the question of what art is. Unfortunately, there is no 
generally accepted efinition of art. 
For the purpose of an economic analysis of art policy, it seems best simply to 
call art everything which is recognizable as art to at least one of the parties in a 
transaction, something which fulfills at least some of the functions at least one of 
the parties thinks art is for. 
Again, if there were perfectly functioning markets for all species of art, gov- 
ernmental intervention would be unnecessary. Therefore, writers arguing in favor 
of public intervention i the art market have to show that market failure occurs. 
Grampp (1989) attempted to present a survey of all arguments in favor of public 
intervention. Some of these arguments are variants of others or have only a few 
supporters and are merely presented tobe instantly demolished by Grampp's neo- 
classical rigor. The remaining arguments have to do with the well-known trio of 
public goods, externalities, and merit goods. Most other writers on the subject (e.g. 
Abbing, 1989; Fullerton, 1991) also present their arguments in the framework of 
these three categories. 
The public good argument has many variants. One simply says that art, old at't 
which has to be safeguarded and new art which is being produced, is something 
which enhances the quality of life for all humankind. Art may also be a reason for 
national or even species pride. Art may also be a way of ordering our experience 
(Gombrich, 1982) and thereby increasing our knowledge and understanding. In 
this way, art might be described as the most basic of the sciences and the same 
(public good) arguments for support of basic science might be invoked in support 
of art policy, both with respect to education and to "research". 
Grampp criticizes the public good argument on the grounds that even accepting 
that art has the properties of a public good, one cannot say how much support 
art deserves in comparison with the many other public goods, such as medical 
services for the poor and elderly, clean forests and beaches, or national security. He 
seems to argue that public policies are only justified if the taxpayers are convinced 
that they get exact worth for their money in such a way that all marginal rates of 
transformation a d substitution are equal. He seems to forget hat because problems 
of choice concerning public goods cannot be effectively solved in the marketplace, 
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and because it is clearly impossible to organize a referendum about every case 
of support for a putative public good, people have governments o which they 
have delegated the task of making decisions about he claims of different public 
goods on the public purse. As Abbing (1989) also argues, if one disagrees with the 
choices the government makes, one can emigrate, or vote against the government, 
or influence the political process by any other means. Precisely because public 
goods are public goods they must be dealt with by the political process, not the 
market process. 
The externalities argument also has many variants. The weakest isto point to the 
huge spin-offs in spending by art customers (Myerscough, 1988; Radich, 1987), 
the additional consumption and resulting employment generated as side-effects of 
art consumption; e.g. consumption and employment a  hotels and restaurants in the 
neighbourhood f a museum or a theater. In the best case, these are only pecuniary 
externalities, hifting the distribution of wealth from one city or region to another, 
and not increasing the total. Real positive xternalities may arise from the fact that 
consumption of an artwork by an individual decreases the price of consumption 
by others or decreases the production costs of other goods. The most extreme case 
of positive externalities would occur if consumption of one person gave another 
person a chance to consume for free. It is sometimes difficult o consume a work 
of art without letting at least some others benefit by imitating, reproducing, or just 
walking along and gazing from a distance. Just as a perfect patent system would 
serve to help internalize the positive externalities of innovation, so would an ideal 
copyright law serve to internalize this kind of externality. However, real copyright 
law has many shortcomings, especially with respect to new forms of art (Kabel, 
1991). Nevertheless, this in itself is not a convincing argument for direct subsidies 
because of presumed externalities. If important externalities of this type exist, it 
always seems to be possible to internalize them, for instance, by building a wall 
around the work of art and selling tickets. If the externalities are not important 
enough to make people pay, if given the choice, the government has no reason to 
do it in their place, except if the externalities are sufficiently general to bring the 
public goods argument into play. 
Lastly, Fullerton (1991) has presented the argument that there are people who 
derive a beneficial effect from having other people consuming art (having your 
cake and seeing others eat it) and that taxing these people to raise the money to 
support he arts would be proper use of the externalities argument. But how to 
identify these people? And if one assumes that the argument holds for the whole 
community, one has again returned to the public good argument. 
The merit good argument essentially says that most people do not realize the full 
extent of the benefits art consumption confers on them. The argument is often linked 
with the proposition that art consumption has the characteristics of an addiction; 
one needs to acquire a "taste" for it, and the more one has consumed, the more one 
wants to consume (Scitovsky, 1972). The government, therefore, considers it as its 
task to promote this type of beneficial addiction. Most people do not accept hat 
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public authorities hould interfere in personal things such as their "taste" in so far 
as it does not harm other individuals or society. Especially with respect to such a 
presumably highly personal area as one's taste in art, writers are scornful towards 
paternalistic merit goods arguments (Fullerton, 1991; Peacock, 1991). 
If the assumptions of traditional neoclassical analysis were true for the art 
markets, only the public goods argument would have any chance of serving as 
legitimation for support of the arts. 
However, the main points of the dynamic ritique of neoclassical naIysis are 
also valid with regard to the art market. 
The characteristics of art markets are not in accordance with the assumptions 
necessary to achieve the neoclassical ideal of pareto-optimal static equilibrium. 
"Production technology" as well as consumer preferences, are in constant flux. 
Innovation can be a crucial success factor, at least in the contemporary arts. Market 
power is unevenly distributed among buyers and sellers, and among players on 
each side of the market. Furthermore, artists, art consumers and public authorities 
are not the supremely rational decision makers of neoclassical fiction. Their ability 
to collect and evaluate information is limited. Public authorities cannot really find 
out how much its constituencies are willing to pay for art and most individuals have 
a very limited knowledge about he art products that are on offer. Also, information 
transfer about he arts is costly and, as argued already, the appropriation of positive 
external effects via intellectual property law is limited. For of these reasons it 
seems appropriate to apply the dynamic approach to the art market and to policy 
legitimation. 
Market failure occurs if the process of dynamic competition is hampered, if
there are obstacles in the way of the gale of creative destruction caused by the 
continual occurrence of cycles of innovation and imitation. If there exist sufficient 
opportunities to innovate and if innovators have no disproportionate problems in 
entering the market, the market will function optimally. 
The public good argument remains essentially unchanged in the dynamic 
approach. In so far as conservation of art works or general education about art 
can be considered public goods, the government has a case to legitimize support 
for these activities. This is also the case with respect to the "art as basic science" 
argument. However, just as the legitimation of support of basic science decreases 
the closer the scientists approach the end of the innovative process, so should sup- 
port for art as a public good concentrate on those activities for which (as yet) no 
viable market exists. 
Most of the versions of the externalities argument that were already dismissed 
in the context of neoclassical analysis fare no better when approached from a 
dynamic angle. The argument for direct subsidies because of the imperfections 
of copyright law was dismissed with regard to art in general. However, the most 
"innovative" works of art may generate much more benefit in the long term than 
can be internalized by copyright. This may partly be the case because these most 
innovative works of art are not immediately marketable, or are not marketable 
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at their "true" worth. The market may need more time to collect and evaluate 
information about them. Especially the most innovative works of art may inspire 
others to produce other works of art or other goods (Abbing, 1989) long after the 
copyright has lapsed. This brings the externalities argument again very close to 
the public good argument that art is a type of basic science. Peacock (1991) urges 
caution with respect to direct subsidies because the subsidies usually are awarded 
by people who have applied for them earlier or who will apply later, or by officials 
who "for understandable r asons wish to develop congenial relations with a few 
established clients." In both cases the risk exists that public support only reaches 
a select group of "incumbent" artists or art institutions. He argues that "... the 
consumer interest may be better served in the long run by reducing the costs of 
new and innovative concerns in the art business." (p. 13). Combining this with the 
points made above, one is led to the conclusion that if there is any substance to 
support for the arts because of the externalities argument, his should be reserved 
to truly innovative artists and institutions. 
One could possibly present an extended version of the merit good argument 
with respect to innovative art. The government should not attempt to prescribe to 
consumers what they should like, but consumers can only choose between products 
when they have some knowledge about them. Therefore they may underrate the 
value consumption of new art could have for them because of an absolute lack of 
information. They may not even know how to inform themselves. Advertising, the 
obvious way to inform consumers of new "normal" products, is not a really viable 
solution for individual innovative artists. Therefore, the government can consider 
it its task to reduce the cost of acquiring this information by subsidizing education 
about the latest developments or shows of new artists, or at least subsidizing 
informing the public on how to acquire information. Of course, this version of 
the argument is only valid with respect o art that is so new or so exceptionally 
innovative that the usual channels of information (reviews in papers etc.) do not 
function properly. 
4. Another Road to the Same Conclusion: Technology Policy for the Arts? 
There seems to be no reason to exclude the art industries from the reach of the 
industrial, competition and technology policies directed at "normal" industries. 
The economic importance of the art industries, not counting external effects, is 
much greater than most people think. The estimated value of the yearly produc- 
tion of paintings in Holland in the 17th century was more than 2/3 the value of 
the cheese production (van der Woude, 1991). The economic importance of the 
contemporary art industries has been demonstrated in reports uch as Hietbrink et 
al. (1985) and Myerscough (1988). If technology policy towards "normal" indus- 
tries is legitimized, why not towards the art industries7 The dynamic approach 
has served as a legitimation for the following types of innovation policy: public 
support for basic science and the scientific infrastructure, support for innovative 
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activities with evidently high positive externalities if this does not lead to higher 
barriers to entry, and other measures to lower barriers to entry. As noted before, 
art is unlike technology with regard to the particular nature of the putative xternal 
effects. However, there seems to be no reason to change the general argument. 
Applied to the art industries, this would mean: support for art education and con- 
servation, support for highly innovative art which may not yet be fully marketable 
and from which high positive externalities are expected to derive, and general 
measures to lower barriers to entry to the art industries, especially by facilitating 
information diffusion. 
These recommendations areequivalent to the conclusions reached at the end of 
the last section. Thus, it seems that a specific art policy is unnecessary. Technology 
policy, intelligently applied to the art industries would suffice. 
Moreover, this would fit in well with the development art policy has gone 
through in the last several decades. Oosterbaan Martinius (1990) has described 
the changes in Dutch art policy since 1945. He distinguishes three phases. In 
the first phase the government (sparingly) supported art because its beauty would 
"elevate the minds of the people." The conservation of art and traditional "high" 
art received most of the support. In the second phase, support for the arts grew 
explosively and the principal aim of art policy shifted from educating people and 
elevating their minds towards providing for their well-being and, also, that of the 
artists. As many people as possible should participate actively and passively in 
art production. All professional artists should have a secure income. The third 
phase brought a reappraisal of the value of the market process. The government 
should not force art upon unwilling citizens, nor should it be forced to support all 
artists. The catchword of the third phase became "quality". Support for education 
and conservation remained fundamentally unchanged. But only art of exceptional 
quality, highly innovative art, was deemed worthy of full public support. Other art 
should earn its place in society by demonstrating that it had a viable market. Only 
then would the government consider partial subsidization. 
The development Oosterbaan Martinius describes is clearly in the direction 
of the transformation of art policy into a subspecies of technology policy, to be 
legitimized on exactly the same grounds. 
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